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 Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-First Century 
Sarah Paterson* 
Adopting a comparative UK/US approach, this article argues for the need to 
rethink corporate bankruptcy theory in the light of developments in the finance 
market. It argues that these developments have produced an effective mechanism, 
in large cases, for selecting between companies which will be worth more if they 
continue to trade and companies which ought to be allowed to fail, such that 
corporate bankruptcy law need no longer concern itself with steering creditor 
choice away from a sale of the business and assets and towards a restructuring. 
Moreover, it suggests that whilst the automatic stay remains a central tenet of 
corporate bankruptcy law where the market decides that the business and assets 
should be sold, in cases where the market sees more value if a company continues to 
trade, corporate bankruptcy law may operate very well without a stay as a 
resolution procedure for deadlocked negotiations. The article identifies that in 
many large restructuring cases the only liabilities which are implicated are 
financial liabilities, and queries the extent to which the distributional concerns of 
the progressive movement, and US federal bankruptcy law, apply where losses are 
shared amongst sophisticated financial institutions. It ends with an explanation of 
why the analysis is limited to large cases, an indication of areas for further research 
and a note of caution for the future. 
 
Keywords: corporate law; comparative law; law and economics; law and 
finance; legal theory 
 
1. Introduction 
                                                     
* Assistant Professor of Law, the London School of Economics and Political Science.  Email: 
S.Paterson@lse.ac.uk. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a roundtable on current issues 
in insolvency law organised by the Harris Manchester College Centre for Commercial Law in 
conjunction with the Oxford Law Faculty, the INSOL academic forum San Francisco 2015 and the 
Insolvency Lawyers’ Association Academic Forum 2015.  The author is grateful to John Armour, 
Jennifer Marshall, Jennifer Payne, Adrian Walters and participants at these events for comments.  All 
views expressed are the author’s own and she is responsible for any errors or omissions. 
US bankruptcy scholars have traditionally described the role of corporate 
bankruptcy law in the following way.
1
 Once a company is in financial 
distress, individual creditors have an incentive to rush to enforce their 
claims against the company's assets in order to be paid out before the assets 
are gone.  If this happens, the company will be broken up piecemeal.  This 
prevents two things from happening.  First, it prevents the creditors from 
agreeing a new deal amongst them, so that the company can continue to 
trade (a restructuring).  Secondly, where a restructuring is not in prospect, it 
prevents the business from being sold as a whole (or as a going concern), 
notwithstanding that this would be likely to attract a higher price than a 
piecemeal realisation of the individual assets.
2
  Although individual 
creditors who win the race to the assets will be better off, overall creditors 
will be worse off (the common pool problem). Thus the purpose of all 
corporate bankruptcy law is to impose a stay (or a moratorium) to prevent 
creditors from taking individual enforcement action to 'grab' assets, so that 
the business can either be restructured or the business and assets sold.
3
  All 
US bankruptcy scholars have generally agreed with corporate bankruptcy 
law’s role in maximising value (the size of the pie), and the role of the stay 
                                                     
1 ‘Bankruptcy’ to an English lawyer relates only to individuals.  In the US, on the other hand, 
‘bankruptcy’ applies to both individuals and companies.  For the purposes of the comparison in this 
article the term ‘corporate bankruptcy’ has been adopted. 
2 See M Harner, 'The Value of Soft Variables in Corporate Reorganizations'  (2015) University of  
Illinois Law Review 509, 510 
3 See TH Jackson, 'Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain' (1982) 
91(5) The Yale Law Journal 857; TH Jackson, 'Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy 
Forum' (1985) 14(1) The Journal of Legal Studies 73; TH Jackson The Logic and Limits of 
Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University Press 1986); TH Jackson, RE Scott, T Eisenberg and M Roe, 
'On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain' (1989) 
75(2) Virginia Law Review 155 
in achieving this.
4
  Controversy rather focuses on the extent to which, and 
the way in which, corporate bankruptcy law should concern itself with how 
value is distributed (how the pie is shared).
5
 
Part of the distributional concern arises because creditors at the top of 
corporate bankruptcy law's order of distributional priority have little 
incentive to agree to a restructuring if (i) they will recover all or most of 
their claims on a sale of the business and assets; and (ii) a sale may be more 
timely, and cheaper to implement.
6
  This leads to a concern that these 
creditors will not agree to a restructuring plan, so that businesses which 
could have been saved will be sold instead, jobs will be needlessly lost and 
other (more vulnerable) creditors, lower in corporate bankruptcy law's order 
of distributional priority, will suffer losses which could have been avoided.
7
  
This is particularly likely to affect trade creditors (who have supplied the 
company but not been paid, or who have paid for goods or services but have 
not received them), and tort creditors who never imagined that they would 
be creditors of the company in the first place.  
As a result, US scholars of what might broadly be described as the 
'progressive school' see a role for corporate bankruptcy law in steering 
                                                     
4 See, for example. JL Westbrook, 'The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy' (2004) 82(4) Texas Law 
Review 798, 821 describing maximisation of value for distribution amongst beneficiaries as the 
'consensus goal' 
5 See, for example, E Warren, 'Bankruptcy Policy' (1987) 54(3) The University of Chicago Law 
Review 775; DR Korobkin, 'Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy' (1991) 91(4) 
Columbia Law Review 717 
6 See, for example, J Johnston, 'The Bankruptcy Bargain' (1991) 65(2) American Bankruptcy Law 
Journal 213, 246-247; E Warren, 'Making Policy with Imperfect Information: the Article 9 Full 
Priority Debates' (1990) 82(6) Cornell Law Review 1373, 1390 
7 See, for example, DG Baird, 'Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms' (1998) 108(3) The Yale Law 
Journal 573, 577 citing K Gross Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System  (1st 
edition, Yale University Press, 1991), 235-43 and Korobkin (n 5), 766-68 
creditor choice away from a sale and a distribution of the proceeds, and 
towards a new bargain.  Law and economics scholars, on the other hand, 
worry that this is to be put the proverbial cart before the horse.  They view 
the role of bankruptcy law as facilitating the allocation of resource in the 
economy to highest and best use.  If capital is withdrawn from businesses 
which are failing, and redeployed in businesses which are succeeding, the 
rest (in terms of jobs and prosperity) will follow.  On the other hand, they 
worry that if corporate bankruptcy law pursues the protection of jobs as an 
independent objective, capital may continue to be deployed in less-efficient 
producers in the economy.
8
  Moreover, they are concerned with the extent to 
which corporate bankruptcy law interferes with the rights of senior, secured 
creditors, and the consequences for the availability and the cost of credit for 
healthy companies.
 9
   
Notwithstanding these concerns, the theoretical framework of the 
progressive school has had a significant influence on US federal bankruptcy 
law.
10
  Management is handed the ability to file a financially distressed 
company for protection pursuant to Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
                                                     
8 See TH Jackson and DA Skeel Jr, 'Bankruptcy and Economic Recovery' University of Pennsylvania 
Law School Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No 13-27, 29-34 (available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2306138) (last accessed 29 May 2015) 
9 See DG Baird, 'Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren' (1987) 
54(3) University of Chicago Law Review 815, 824-28; RK Rasmussen, 'The Ex Ante Effects of 
Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives' (1994) 72 Washington University Law Quarterly 1159, 
1162-65; DA Skeel Jr, Debt’s Dominion: a History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton 
University Press 2001), 224; G Triantis, 'The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization in 
Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers and Guillotines' (1996) 16(1) International Review of 
Law and Economics, 101 
10 See, for example, Skeel Debt's Dominion (n 9), 227  
Code,
11
 and Chapter 11 provides a strong, automatic stay on individual 
creditor action.
12
  In other words, management is provided with an effective 
veto over creditor threats.
13
  Moreover, once a Chapter 11 filing has been 
made, management is handed the almost exclusive right to propose the 
solution to the company's problems for the first 120 days after a filing, on 
the assumption that members of management will prefer a restructuring plan 
(which will save their jobs) over a sale (which may not).
14
  Detailed 
machinery has developed over time which enables the bankruptcy judge to 
impose a restructuring plan on dissenting creditors, so that it can be 
implemented with less than unanimous consent.
15
 Thus US federal 
bankruptcy law offers not only a strong stay against creditor action, but also 
a structure which incentivises restructuring rather than sale.  Not 
surprisingly, law and economics scholars are highly critical of some of these 
policy choices, and a lively literature has followed.
16
 
                                                     
11 Section 301 of  the US Bankruptcy Code 
12 Section 362 of the US Bankruptcy Code 
13 See H Miller and S Waisman, 'Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for 
Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?' (2004) 78(2) American Bankruptcy Law Journal 
153, 176-177;  DA Skeel Jr, 'An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy' 
(1998) 51(5) Vanderbilt Law Review 1325, 1377-1380; H Miller, 'Chapter 11 in Transition – From 
Boom to Bust and into the Future' (2007) 81(4) American Bankruptcy Law Journal 375, 386-387 
14 Section 1121(a)-(d) of the US Bankruptcy Code, which can be extended for up to eighteen months 
(this limit on extensions was added in 2005). For a description of how this incentivises a restructuring 
see RD Thomas, ‘Tipping the Scales in Chapter 11: How Distressed Debt Investors Decrease Debtor 
Leverage and the Efficacy of Business Reorganization’(2010) 27 Emory Bankruptcy Developments 
Journal 213, 225-226; Jackson and Skeel, ‘Bankruptcy and Economic Recovery’ (n 8), 25-26 
15 For a more detailed description of the technical provisions see R Olivares-Caminal, J Douglas, R 
Guynn, A Kornberg, S Paterson, D Singh and H Stonefrost Debt Restructuring (Oxford University 
Press 2011) 103-114  
16 See, for example, LM LoPucki ‘The Debtor in Full Control – Systems Failure under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code?’ (1983) 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 247, 249; M Bradley and M 
Rosenzweig, 'The Untenable Case for Chapter 11' (1992) 101(5) The Yale Law Journal 1043; L 
Bebchuk and H Chang, 'Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization' (1992) 
8(2) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 179, 253; BE Adler, 'Financial and Political 
We do not find the theoretical framework of the progressive school 
clearly reflected in English law.  Instead, English law offers multiple 
procedures,
17
 only sometimes offers a moratorium on creditor action,
18
 and 
offers a weaker moratorium where one is available at all.
19
  Over the years 
this has been a cause of concern for English policy makers, scholars and 
practitioners and there has been an occasional dalliance with reform.
20
  
However, the powerful deposit banks, which have traditionally provided the 
bulk of finance to corporate Britain, have raised serious objections to reform 
which reflect many of the concerns of law and economics scholars in the 
US.  First, they warn of the risk of a decrease in the availability of finance, 
and an increase in the cost of credit, if corporate bankruptcy law interferes 
significantly with secured creditor rights.  Secondly, they argue that by 
steering creditors away from a sale, and towards restructuring, companies 
which should have been allowed to fail will continue in business, draining 
                                                                                                                                       
Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy' (1993) 45(2) Stanford Law Review 311; LM LoPucki, 
‘The Trouble with Chapter 11’ (1993) Wisconsin Law Review 729; DA Skeel Jr,  ‘Rethinking the 
Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1994) 72(3) Texas Law Review 471, 535; 
A Schwartz, 'A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy' (1998) 107(6) The Yale Law 
Journal 1807; DA Skeel Jr,  ‘Creditors’ Ball: The New New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11’ 
(2003) 152(2) University of Pensylvania Law Review 917, 920-21  
17 There are six procedures: compulsory winding up, creditors' voluntary winding up, receivership, 
administration, company voluntary arrangement and schemes of arrangement 
18 A moratorium is imposed in administration and compulsory liquidation.  There is no automatic 
moratorium in a creditors' voluntary winding up, although it is possible to apply to court for a stay 
(section 112(1) Insolvency Act 1986).  A moratorium is available in a company voluntary 
arrangement, but only for small companies satisfying 2 or more of the requirements in section 382 of 
the Companies Act 2006.  There is no moratorium in a scheme of arrangement or receivership 
19 The stay in compulsory liquidation does not prohibit enforcement by a secured creditor (in re David 
Lloyd & Co (1877) 6 Ch. D 339, 343-46). The moratorium in an administration proceeding does but it 
does not prevent a party from terminating a contract for insolvency (Re Olympia & York [1993] BCC 
154) whilst such ipso facto clauses are stayed in Chapter 11 
20 Most notably the reforms introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002, discussed below 
resources away from other, more successful businesses.
21
  Over the years 
these concerns have tended to trump concerns for creditors lower in 
corporate bankruptcy law's distributional order of priority, and powerful 
financial creditors have effectively been trusted to select between businesses 
which should be saved and businesses which should be allowed to fail. 
These arguments also appeal to English lawyers' broader respect for 
freedom of contract, and their pathological fear of interfering too early and 
too extensively in contractual rights, lest England become a less attractive 
place to do business.
22
  
  Recently, four significant adaptations in the finance markets have 
appeared to be driving the practice of restructuring in the UK and the US 
closer together, at least for large and larger mid-cap companies, and 
notwithstanding the different theoretical frameworks reflected in the law on 
the books.  The first adaptation is the increasing globalisation and 
diversification of the type of creditor providing finance, particularly in the 
UK.
23
 The second is the rise of financing arrangements in which a financial 
creditor has security over all, or substantially all, of the assets of the debtor, 
                                                     
21See, for example, G McCormack, ‘The Priority of Secured Credit: An Anglo-American Perspective’ 
(2003) The Journal of Business Law 389, 390-392; I Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent 
Developments – Changes to Administrative Receivership, Administration, and Company Voluntary 
Arrangements – the Insolvency Act 2000, The White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’ 
(2004) 5(1) European Business Organization Law Review 119, 129-130; J Armour, A Hsu and A 
Walters, ‘Corporate Insolvency in the United Kingdom: The Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002’ 
(2008) 5(2) European Company and Financial Law Review 148, 161-162; R Bork Rescuing 
Companies in England and Germany (Oxford University Press 2012), 147-148  
22 See, for example, R Calnan,‘Ban the Ban: Prohibiting Restrictions on Assignment of Receivables’ 
(2015) 30(3) Journal of International Banking and Finance Law 136, 137  
23 See J Armour, ‘The Rise of the ‘Pre-pack’: Corporate Restructuring in the UK and Proposals for 
Reform’ in RP Austin and FJG Aoun (eds), Restructuring Companies in Troubled Times: Director 
and Creditor Perspectives (Ross Parsons Centre of Commercial, Corporate and Taxation Law 2012) 
43-78 
particularly in the US.
24
  The third is increasing debt-raising capacity, with 
the result that large and larger mid-cap companies have significantly higher 
ratios of debt to equity than we might hitherto have expected.
25
  The last is 
the development of a specialist market for the purchase of the debt of 
financially distressed companies in both jurisdictions.
26
  Moreover, as the 
service sector grows in both jurisdictions, many companies are defined by 
cash flows rather than hard assets, and by the team of employees which goes 
up and down in the lift every day, so that preserving cash flow becomes a 
priority, there are few hard assets to enforce against and the team of 
employees must be kept together.
27
 
 Notwithstanding predictions that these adaptations in the finance 
market, and the changing nature of the debtors themselves, would drive law 
in one regime closer to the law in the other regime,
28
 arguably the two 
                                                     
24 Harner, ‘The Value of Soft Variables' in Corporate Reorganizations’ (n 2), 515-517 
25 BR Cheffins and J Armour The Eclipse of Private Equity  (University of Cambridge, Centre for 
Business Research, 2007), 33 
26 For the development of the market in the US see CJ Fortgang and TM Mayer, ‘Trading Claims and 
Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11’ (1990) 12 Cardozo Law Review 1; CJ Fortgang and 
TM Mayer, ‘Developments in Trading Claims: Participations and Disputed Claims’ (1993) 15 
Cardozo Law Review 733; MH Whitaker, ‘Regulating Claims Trading in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: A 
Proposal for Mandatory Disclosure’ (1993) 3 Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy 303; S Gilson, 
'Investing in Distressed Situations: A Market Survey' (1995) 51(6) Financial Analysts Journal 8; F 
Tung, ‘Confirmation and Claims Trading’ (1995) 90 North Western University Law Review 1684; 
PM Goldschmid, ‘More Phoenix than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Process’ 2005 Columbia Business Law Review 191; M Harner,  ‘The 
Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing' (2008) 
77 Fordham Law Review 703; M Harner, ‘Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study 
of Investors’ Objectives’(2008) 16 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Rev 69.  For the development 
of the market in the UK see S. Paterson, ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring – Market Norms, 
Legal Rights and Regulatory Standards’ (2014) 14(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 333 
27 See DG Baird and RK Rasmussen, ‘The End of Bankruptcy’ (2002) 55(3) Stanford Law Review 
751, 758, 762-765; Miller and Waisman (n 13), 192-193 and LM LoPucki, ‘The Nature of the 
Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen’s “The End of Bankruptcy”’ (2003) 56(3) 
Stanford Law Review 645, 651-659  
28 See, for example, J Armour, BR Cheffins and DA Skeel Jr, 'Corporate Ownership Structure and the 
Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom’ (2002) 55(6) Vanderbilt Law 
Review, 1733, 1775-1776 
regimes have been meeting somewhere in the middle.
29
  As a result, there 
have been fewer assaults on US federal bankruptcy law by law and 
economics scholars.
30
  English scholars, practitioners and policy makers 
wonder whether some reform of law on the books might be advisable to 
better reflect the practice of UK restructuring.
31
  In contrast, the American 
Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 11 has been 
considering whether some reform of law on the books is necessary to bring 
about changes in the practice of US restructuring, and its recent report and 
recommendations appear to reaffirm a commitment to reforming Chapter 
11, so that it continues to meet the two, traditional policy objectives of 
reducing the incentive for creditor action and steering creditors towards a 
restructuring.
32
  It may be, therefore, that the two jurisdictions will draw 
apart again. 
 As a result of the adaptations in the markets, this article will suggest 
that a generally efficient market mechanism exists for choosing between 
good companies with the wrong capital structure (which ought to be 
restructured) and companies with more profound problems (so that the 
                                                     
29 See, for example, G McCormack, ‘Control and Corporate Rescue – An Anglo-American 
Evaluation’ (2007) 56(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 515, 516; Harner, ‘The 
Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing’ (n 26), 
757-758 
30 See, for example, MB Jacoby, ‘What Should Judges do in Chapter 11?’ (2015) University of 
Illinois Law Review 571, 580-581  
31 See, for example, the measured response to a recent Government consultation on the European 
Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency C (2014) 
1500 final from the City of London Law Society (available at 
http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=132&Itemid=4
69)  (last accessed 29 May 2015) 
32 ABI Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 11 2012-2014 Final Report and Recommendations 
(available at http://commission.abi.org/) (last accessed 29 May 2015) 
business and assets ought to be sold in insolvency proceedings).  For large 
and larger mid-cap companies it will propose an analytic divide between the 
role of corporate bankruptcy law when debts are to be restructured, on the 
one hand, and when assets and liabilities are to be sold to a third party for 
the best price reasonably obtainable (an insolvency), on the other, with the 
market choosing between the two.  Whilst corporate bankruptcy law 
continues to be primarily concerned with dis-incentivising individual 
creditor action in an insolvency situation, in a restructuring it primarily 
provides a deadlock resolution procedure.   The article will suggest that 
there may yet be a case for reform of the law, but to address new concerns 
emerging in new markets, rather than to reinforce the law’s response to old 
concerns from an old market.  Finally, it will argue that the new concerns 
relate largely to the availability and cost of credit and, as a result, are likely 
to be the source of less controversy between law and economics scholars 
and progressive scholars, between policy makers, or between the US and the 
UK.  In short, they largely raise empirical questions rather than 
philosophical ones. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  First, the development of 
modern insolvency and restructuring law in the US and the UK is briefly 
explored, showing how each jurisdiction set off along divergent paths but 
recent developments suggested convergence. The second part considers the 
significance of these market changes for bankruptcy theory and briefly 
considers certain new proposals and recommendations from the ABI 
Commission which indicate a re-affirming of the traditionally different 
philosophical approach and a possibility for the two jurisdictions to draw 
back apart.
33
 The final part of the article suggests a new theoretical 
framework for the role of corporate bankruptcy law when large and larger 
mid-cap companies face financial distress, and a few reflections for further 
research. 
 
2 The Development of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in the US and the 
UK 
A Restructuring Law in the US: 1979 to 1990 
 
US restructuring law had its start at the end of the nineteenth century with 
the restructuring of the railroads.
34
 There was a strong public interest in 
restructuring the railroads, which were seen as providers of prosperity and 
modernity.
35
  Moreover, a piecemeal realisation of railroad assets was 
unlikely to produce much of value for anyone; as Miller and Waisman put 
it, ‘There was a broad national consensus that the troubled railroad industry 
must be saved, the absence of which would leave “nothing but a streak of 
                                                     
33 Ibid 
34 See, for example, A Martin,  ‘Railroads and the Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional 
Change’ (1974) 34(3) The Journal of Economic History 685; Korobkin (n 5); Skeel, ‘An Evolutionary 
Theory' (n 13), 1353-1358; Skeel, Debt’s Dominion (n 9); DG Baird and R Rasmussen,  ‘Control 
Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations' (2001) 87(5) 
Virginia Law Review 921, 925-936; Miller and Waisman (n 13);  DG Baird,  ‘Present at the Creation: 
the SEC and the Origins of the Absolute Priority Rule' (2010) 18(2) American Bankruptcy Institute 
Law Review 591 
35 Skeel Debt's Dominion (n 9), 60-63 
iron-rust on the prairie”’.36  But the railroads had issued multiple series of 
bonds, and different bondholders had security over different assets.  Many 
of these assets were 'hard' assets, capable of realisation for cash.
37
  Thus the 
concern of railroad restructuring was to prevent individual enforcement and 
dismemberment of the company.
38
   
Moreover, the holders of the bonds were widely dispersed 
geographically (many investors were based in England).
39
 Thus a critical 
question was how to coordinate the restructuring effort, whilst preserving 
going concern value to maximise overall creditor return.
40
  Scholars have 
shown how the likes of JP Morgan fulfilled this function in the era of the 
railroads, both raising capital in the primary markets and coordinating 
restructuring efforts when issuers faced financial distress.
41
  
The ability of the Wall Street Banks to fulfil this coordination role was 
neutered by the New Deal reforms following the Great Depression,
42
  and 
management was replaced by a trustee in Chapter X of the Chandler Act 
(intended to facilitate large restructurings).
43
 This resulted in very few 
Chapter X cases and efforts to adapt Chapter XI (designed for a different 
                                                     
36 Miller and Waisman (n 13), 161, citing Cent. Trust Co of NY v Wabash 29 F. 618, 626 (E.D. Mo. 
1886) 
37 Miller and Waisman (n 13), 164. For a good description of the practice of granting discrete sections 
of track or assets as collateral see Skeel, ‘An Evolutionary Theory’ (n 13), 1355-1356 and Skeel, 
Debt’s Dominion (n 9), 62.  See also Baird and Rasmussen, ‘The End of Bankruptcy’ (n 27),  779-780 
and references therein 
38 See Westbrook (n 4), 810  
39 Baird and Rasmussen, 'Control Rights'  (n 34), 927. 
40 Westbrook (n 4), 810 
41 Skeel Debt's Dominion (n 9), 63-69; Baird and Rasmussen, 'Control Rights'  (n 34), 928 
42 Baird and Rasmussen, 'Control Rights' (n 34), 934-935; Skeel Debt's Dominion (n 9), 110-113; 
Skeel, ‘An Evolutionary Theory’ (n 13), 1368. 
43 Skeel Debt's Dominion (n 9), 119-127;  Skeel 'An Evolutionary Theory' (n 13), 1368-1372; Skeel  
‘Creditor’s Ball ‘ (n 16),  920; Miller and Waisman (n 13), 169-70. 
purpose) for large corporate restructurings. Thus, in the reforms of corporate 
bankruptcy law in 1978, management was allowed to remain in place in a 
Chapter 11 case, incentives were built into the Chapter 11 process making it 
an attractive option for management to use and a strong stay on creditor 
action was imposed on filing.
44
  Moreover, management was handed 
significant power to control the course of the case,
45
  in the expectation that 
directors would prefer a reorganisation (which would save their jobs) over 
enforcement and sale (which would not).   
Finally, a robust architecture was to develop in Chapter 11 to impose a 
restructuring plan on dissenting shareholders and creditors.  First, 
shareholders and creditors affected by the restructuring plan are divided into 
classes to vote upon it.  A two-thirds majority of voting members of a class 
is required to accept the plan, and if every impaired class votes in favour of 
the plan then it may be confirmed by the court, subject to satisfaction of 
various other matters.  If at least one impaired class votes in favour of the 
plan but others do not, the court may nonetheless confirm the plan over the 
objections of the dissenting classes (literally 'cram it down' on the dissenting 
classes) provided the plan meets the best interests test (creditors get at least 
as much as they would get on a liquidation); does not discriminate unfairly 
(generally, a class receives relatively equal value to similar classes); and 
                                                     
44 See, for example, Bradley and M Rosenzweig; Bebchuk and Chang; Adler and Schwartz (n 16) all 
cited in KM Ayotte and ER Morrison,  ‘Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11’ (2009) 1(2) 
Journal of Legal Analysis 511 
45 Miller & Waisman (n 13), 176-7; Skeel,‘An Evolutionary Theory’ (n 13), 1377-1380; H Miller,  
‘Chapter 11 in Transition – From Boom to Bust and into the Future’ (2007) 81 American Bankruptcy 
Law Journal, 386-387. 
meets the requirements of the absolute priority rule (a junior class does not 
recover until a senior class has recovered in full, but a senior class does not 
recover more than it is owed).
46
   Thus the legacy of the railroad era is 
clearly visible in Chapter 11: a positive policy of (i) reducing incentives for 
creditor action and (ii) promoting a restructuring over a sale of the business 
and assets.  But, as we shall see, the UK set off down a very different track. 
 
B Restructuring Law in the UK: 1979 to 1990 
 
The structure of the finance market in the UK during this period was very 
different. It was dominated by powerful deposit-taking or ‘clearing’ banks 
which provided the vast bulk of finance in the economy.
47
 These banks had 
different incentives from those of the widely dispersed creditors in the US. 
They had every incentive to monitor the companies they invested in, calling 
management to account at the earliest signs of distress.
48
 Coordination 
problems could still arise where more than one bank provided credit to a 
company but, from the 1980s onwards, these were dealt with under ‘The 
London Approach’.  This was a set of principles on how banks ought to 
behave when a company faced financial distress, originally seeded by the 
Bank of England, and subsequently enforced through the threat of 
reputational sanction in a small market of repeated interaction amongst a 
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Legal Studies, 83 
defined number of players.
49
 Thus law took almost no part in solving the 
coordination problems between banks, stepping in only once the 
stakeholders had decided that they were no longer willing to finance the 
business, to provide the necessary procedure to enable the business and 
assets, or assets, to be sold to a third party.
50
   
In 1998 the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Peter 
Mandelsson, went on a trade mission to Silicon Valley and was educated in 
the central policy concern of Chapter 11: that a senior class may prefer to 
enforce and sell at a low point in the credit cycle, causing losses for other 
stakeholders which might not have occurred if the company had continued 
to operate.
51
  English insolvency law’s model of creditor control did not 
measure up well against this theoretical framework.
52
  The banks had an 
almost unfettered power to select between debt restructuring and 
enforcement and sale, and the insolvency procedure in the shadow of which 
banks negotiated (receivership, renamed administrative receivership in the 
1986 reforms following the Cork Report),
53
 afforded them significant 
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and perhaps without much empirical support)
54
 that rather than persevering 
with a restructuring, the banks may be incentivised simply to put the 
business into receivership, sell the assets and realise the proceeds, imposing 
losses on trade creditors with unpaid liabilities which could have been 
avoided if the company had been restructured.
55
  In effect, we began to 
worry that our insolvency system measured up poorly to its US cousin. 
Ultimately, this was to lead to the abolition of administrative receivership 
and its replacement with a more collective procedure, administration.
56
 
Moreover, a hierarchy of purposes for administration was inserted, with 
rescue of the company right at the top.
57
  
But a number of challenges persisted.  Although the reforms purported 
to incentivise management to seek rescue through administration, when a 
company was placed into administration, an insolvency practitioner replaced 
management except to the extent that he or she expressly left them to 
continue their functions (which the administrator rarely did).
58
 The 
insolvency practitioner then controlled the decision to move from rescue of 
the company to the second purpose of administration, a sale of the business 
and assets, with a very wide margin of appreciation in his decision-making 
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54 On the lack of empirical evidence see Frisby, ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime’ (n 53), 253.  
55 See, for example, Insolvency Service, A Review of Company Rescue and Business Reconstruction 
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power.
59
  Crucially, the lenders continued to control the identity of the 
insolvency practitioner, who had little incentive to ignore their wishes if he 
or she were to hope to receive future work.
60
 On a market level, although 
debt-for-equity swaps did happen, they were comparatively rare.
61
 More 
often banks would agree to a series of non-core disposals (to pay down debt) 
and covenant holidays and revised amortisation schedules (to create space 
for the company to get back on its feet). Sometimes this would be successful 
but a company with a high ratio of debt to equity had the cards stacked 
against it in turning things around, compared with the far more dynamic 
reshaping of the balance sheet in the US. In short, nothing was to change. 
Administration became the insolvency procedure against which banks 
sought to renegotiate, restructuring generally still occurred out of court and 
administration was reserved for a sale of the business and assets, or assets, 
to a third party if the banks decided that they were no longer willing to 
support the business. 
 
C The Birth of the Distressed Debt Market and the Rise of Secured Credit: 
US 
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Profound change was, however, to occur in the practice of restructuring on 
both sides of the Atlantic as a result of three developments in the financial 
markets. The first development was the emergence of a specialist market for 
buying the debt of financially distressed companies in the US in the 1980s 
and 90s, subsequently spreading to the UK.
62
  The second was the reform of 
the Uniform Commercial Code in the US which made it significantly easier 
for creditors to perfect security over all or substantially all of the company's 
assets: a so-called ‘blanket lien’.63 These two developments effectively 
neutered the use of Chapter 11 as a threat by management to control creditor 
power. This is because lenders who have explicitly bought into the debt in 
order to control the restructuring increasingly have security over all of the 
company’s assets put in place either before default, or immediately after 
default as a condition of continued support. This security interest enables 
them to control access to cash for financing the business, effectively 
enabling them to dictate the course of the case.
64
   As secured creditors exert 
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considerably greater control over the decision between restructuring, on the 
one hand, and a sale of the business and assets on the other, functionally 
Chapter 11 begins to look considerably more like restructuring and 
insolvency practice in the UK. 
 Moreover, increasingly companies which face financial distress have 
a far greater ratio of debt to equity than companies which faced financial 
distress in the early days of Chapter 11, and more complex capital 
structures.
65
  These complex capital structures often involve ‘layers’ or 
‘tranches’ of debt regulated by contractual priority agreements between the 
lenders, known as intercreditor agreements.  Debt which ranks first in 
priority on an insolvency under these intercreditor arrangements is known as 
senior debt.  ‘Junior’ debt ranks behind the senior debt and attracts higher 
pricing to reflect the higher risk.  In other words, these agreements provide 
detailed priority and control provisions.  Moreover, it is likely that the 
financial liabilities governed by these arrangements will be sufficient to 
absorb the losses on the balance sheet, so that there is no need to bring trade 
creditors into the restructuring plan.
66
  This has a number of advantages.  
Trade creditors may be smaller, less sophisticated players who have a more 
emotional response to loss than the large financial players, making it 
difficult to reach an accommodation with them.
67
  Furthermore, it reduces 
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the number of parties to the restructuring negotiations, cutting down the cost 
and time taken to reach a settlement.  Perhaps most critically of all, it 
preserves the company's cash flows by indicating to trade creditors that they 
have no reason to cease supply or to withdraw their custom, and it preserves 
the team of employees by indicating that they have no reason to seek 
employment elsewhere.  As highlighted at the outset, as many modern 
companies are little more than ‘a good idea, a handful of people …  and a 
bunch of contracts’,68 preserving cash flows and people is likely to be a 
significant part of the restructuring implementation plan.  Thus the 
restructuring negotiations become a horse trade amongst senior and junior 
creditors and the shareholders as to how the losses should be shared 
amongst them.  
 
D The Birth of the Distressed Debt Market and the Rise of Secured  Credit: 
UK 
 
At the same time, changes in the UK debt market, coupled with the arrival 
of the distressed debt traders in the UK, were to draw UK restructuring and 
insolvency practice closer to the US. In the first place, banks started to move 
from the model of ‘concentrated creditor governance’ described above 
towards a model of arranging loans but subsequently distributing their own 
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participation in them.
69
 This was to severely weaken the model for 
achieving a restructuring in the UK, given that it challenged the ongoing 
effectiveness of the London Approach and reduced the incentive for any one 
bank, or small group of banks, to undertake monitoring.
70
 Furthermore, 
increasingly other sorts of investors bought participations in loans. As these 
diverse stakeholders suffered increasing coordination issues, borrowers also 
started to access debt capital markets to a far greater extent.
71
 Finally, 
although it has historically been straightforward to take a security interest 
over all of a company's assets in England and Wales, until the emergence of 
highly leveraged debt structures, most large company financings were 
unsecured. This was to change with the private equity boom, yet 
management had no credible levers to pull, given that administration was as 
likely as not to result in them losing their jobs.
72
 As a result of all of these 
factors, corporates experiencing financial distress suffered many of the 
coordination problems in renegotiating with lenders as those in the US had 
found before them.   
There was, therefore, a role for law to play in solving these coordination 
problems, but no single procedure had been properly designed to deal with 
them. Administration, as a standalone option, did not fit the bill for all the 
reasons already given. As a result, English lawyers developed two different 
techniques. The first, where unanimity could not be achieved in every class 
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72 Cheffins and Armour, Eclipse of Private Equity (n 25), 33   
but a majority in each supported the restructuring, was to use the scheme of 
arrangement procedure which had been on the company law statute books 
since the nineteenth century.
73
 The second, where a class of financial 
creditor (or the equity) was unwilling to support the plan, or was to be 
offered nothing within it, was to ‘twin’ the scheme of arrangement with a 
pre-packaged administration.
74
 In a pre-packaged administration, the 
administrator is introduced to management before appointment, observes the 
negotiation of a sale from the side lines, satisfies him or herself that the sale 
offers the best way forward and implements it immediately upon 
appointment. In a restructuring scenario, the pre-packaged administration is 
used to ‘sell’ the operating subsidiaries comprising the business to a new 
company owned by those stakeholders to whom equity has been allocated in 
the restructuring, in consideration for a release of their debt, leaving those 
who have been offered nothing stranded in an insolvent finance company 
with no assets.
75
 
Thus the administration ‘sale’ is used for a purpose for which it was 
never envisaged and the disadvantages of a truly manager-displacing 
structure avoided (there is nothing to stop management emerging as the 
directors of the new company, often with significant equity in the new 
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business).
76
 In short, English lawyers are able to adapt insolvency 
procedures to achieve a Chapter 11-style debt restructuring instead. 
 
3 Implications of Market Changes for Bankruptcy Theory 
 
 
A Implications of the Distressed Debt Market 
 
Let us turn now to the implications of these new market dynamics for 
bankruptcy theory.  The difference between the value of the company if it is 
sold and the proceeds distributed and the value if it is restructured and 
continues to trade is known as the restructuring surplus. As we have seen, it 
has traditionally been a principal objective of Chapter 11 to capture it by 
two mechanisms: by imposing a strong, automatic stay on filing (so that 
senior creditors are prevented from taking enforcement action), and by 
providing management with strong control rights (on the assumption that 
they will prefer a restructuring to a sale).   As we have also seen, each of 
these mechanisms is under threat.  But the question arises: does it matter? 
Specialist distressed debt funds regularly raise money from investors on 
the promise of high returns, and are thus focused on maximising profit.
77
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Other types of traditional investor (such as banks), who have lent money to 
the company when it was healthy, are likely to be interested in minimising 
their loss.
78
  It is for this reason that banks may prefer an enforcement and 
sale over the rather uncertain prospects of a restructuring plan, whilst the 
distressed debt market is interested in upside.  The distressed debt market 
now offers the traditional creditors an alternative: a negotiated sale of the 
debt at a certain price and a predictable loss, without the risks of an 
enforcement and sale process.  Where the market identifies a restructuring 
surplus there will be a period of time during which those creditors who do 
not wish to stay with the company through the restructuring process trade 
out, and those who see opportunity in the restructuring process trade in.  
Negotiations for a restructured bargain can then get underway in earnest.       
Distressed debt investors who trade in may have different investment 
strategies.
79
 Some will buy debt at a deep discount to par or face value in the 
expectation that the price of the debt, or the equity it is swapped into, will 
trade up in the secondary market in anticipation of, or after, a successful 
restructuring, such that they will be able to sell this debt or equity at a profit. 
This is a comparatively short term investment horizon. Others seek to 
capture the difference between the sale price of the business today (reflected 
in the price at which debt is trading in the market) and the sale price after 
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things have settled down in two or three years. These investors seek to buy 
up debt which they regard as trading cheaply, having regard to their own 
assessment of the prospects for the business, and to make maximum profit 
(often far in excess of the face value of the debt) after deleveraging the 
balance sheet through a debt-for-equity swap, fixing certain operational 
issues in the business or simply waiting until the market has recovered, 
before selling or floating the company.  In both cases, as Michelle Harner 
puts it, ‘Investors generally realize a gain on distressed debt investments 
when the debtor achieves, or the market anticipates, a successful 
turnaround’.80    
If the distressed debt market will seek to exploit any potential 
restructuring surplus,  there should be no need for the law either to provide a 
moratorium or to steer creditor choice towards a restructuring and away 
from a sale.  Distressed debt investing provides a means for those who no 
longer wish to remain invested in a firm with a new risk profile to exit 
without the cost and risk of enforcement and sale. It restricts the sale of 
assets to third parties, and distribution of proceeds amongst creditors, to 
those situations where the market identifies no restructuring surplus, with 
the market selecting which companies are able to survive and which 
companies should be liquidated.    
Yet when we turn to the US literature something of a puzzle emerges.  
When a company files for Chapter 11 four possibilities are open to it.  First, 
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the case may be converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation case.
81
  Secondly, the 
company may propose a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization (in a large case 
typically a debt-for-equity swap) pursuant to section 1129 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code.
82
  Thirdly, it may propose to sell its business and assets, 
or assets, pursuant to a Chapter 11 liquidating plan.
83
  Finally, it may 
propose a rapid sale of the business and assets pursuant to section 363 of the 
US Bankruptcy Code.
84
  The US literature reports an increase in these rapid 
section 363 sales of businesses and assets as a result of senior, secured, 
distressed debt investor control.
85
 This suggests that the traditional concern 
that senior, secured creditors may prefer enforcement of security and sale 
over preservation of the restructuring surplus is alive and well.  Yet it is an 
intuitively surprising conclusion that the distressed debt investor will be 
happy with the profit captured between the amount paid for the debt and the 
amount received on an enforcement of security and sale of the assets to a 
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third party, in circumstances where the market sees the potential for a 
restructuring surplus which will either be reflected in the trading price of the 
debt or the trading price of the equity allocated in the restructuring, or 
reflected in the ultimate sale price for the company once it has traded out of 
a difficult market with an appropriate capital structure.   
Reading the US literature with this puzzle in mind, it is difficult to 
unpick the story because many authors refer interchangeably to a section 
363 sale of the business to some of the financial creditors, and a section 363 
sale of the business and assets to a third party, without distinguishing 
between the two and without identifying which assets and liabilities were 
transferred in the sale.
86
  In large and larger mid-cap company restructurings 
section 363 may be used to sell the entire business to a new company owned 
by the financial creditors, in consideration for release of the transferring 
financial creditors' debt claims (known as credit bidding).  After the sale, the 
transferring financial creditors own the equity in a new company owning the 
business, whilst other financial creditors may be left behind. Where the 
trade creditors are kept whole, this transaction is functionally a debt-for-
equity swap amongst certain of the financial creditors.  It is a different thing 
entirely from the situation in which a section 363 sale is used to transfer the 
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business to a third party, together with those assets and liabilities which the 
third party is prepared to assume, leaving other trade liabilities unpaid and 
providing cash proceeds which are only sufficient to compensate secured, 
financial creditors.  In the UK, at least, most schemes of arrangement 
‘twinned’ with pre-packaged administrations in large and larger mid-cap 
cases fall into the first category.  In other words, they do not result in the 
sale of a financially distressed, but economically viable, business to a third 
party for cash, with losses for trade and other creditors which could have 
been avoided if a restructuring had been pursued instead.  Functionally, they 
are debt for equity swaps amongst financial creditors. 
  We may still have concerns about a debt restructuring implemented 
via section 363 (rather than through a Chapter 11 plan in the US),
87
 or via  a 
pre-packaged administration sale in the UK.
88
  We may be concerned that 
distressed debt investors (for who speed is of the essence) have taken legal 
procedures which were developed to facilitate a better realisation of the 
assets and adapted them to achieve a quick and dirty debt restructuring to 
the detriment of other financial creditors.
89
  But different distributional 
concerns are implicated than those which arise when senior, secured 
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creditors prefer enforcement and sale of the business and assets pursuant to 
section 363 to a third party, over a restructuring of a financially (but not 
economically) distressed company with the result that jobs will be lost and 
trade creditors will suffer heavy losses which could have been avoided.
90
  
We should not assume that what two US scholars have described as US 
corporate bankruptcy law’s ‘normative distributional commitments’91 are 
the same whether we are examining distribution amongst sophisticated 
financial creditors or distribution between financial creditors and 
employees, trade and tort creditors. 
 
B Other financial creditors 
 
Even if distressed debt investors prefer to capture any restructuring surplus, 
we may still be concerned with our original policy objectives of imposing a 
moratorium and steering creditor choice if there are investors who do not 
choose to sell to the distressed debt investor, and who continue to prefer 
enforcement and sale.  But it is suggested here that this will not normally be 
the case in large or larger mid-cap cases.  First, let us consider a senior 
creditor who believes it is amply covered by the value of the assets in the 
business and who does not like the price quoted in the distressed debt 
market. In their article on restructuring in the UK in the early 1990s, 
Armour and Deakin note that it is ‘rational for … a creditor to refrain from 
                                                     
90 See, for example, Bussel and Klee (n 86), 663; Jacoby and Janger, ‘Ice Cube Bonds’ (n 85)  
91 M Jacoby and EJ Janger, ‘Ice Cube Bonds’ (n 85), 873 
enforcing if it thinks that the returns to renegotiation will be higher than its 
likely return in insolvency’.92  The senior secured creditor who is amply 
covered by the collateral in the business, but who considers the distressed 
debt market is mispricing its return, given the prospects for a restructuring, 
is ordinarily in this position. Certain types of creditor may have particular 
incentives to prefer a legal process. Collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) 
may be limited in their ability actively to vote on a restructuring but they are 
also likely to prefer to collect fees for as long as possible, and are unlikely 
to favour an enforcement sale.
93
 Holders of credit default swap (CDS) 
protection may actively prefer an enforcement sale because it will be a clear 
trigger event in their documentation.
94
 However, these holders are not 
incentivised to initiate an enforcement sale because doing so may lead to 
concerns that they are not entitled to claim, as a consequence of having 
brought about the trigger event.
95
 And junior creditors and equity have no 
incentive to enforce because the priority rights afforded to senior creditors 
means this will almost certainly result in a loss of value.
96
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Moreover, in comparatively recent times, a significant strand of 
scholarship has grown up in the US arguing for ‘privatisation of 
bankruptcy’; in other words, that contract law could provide an effective 
substitute for restructuring and insolvency law.
97
 Whilst this remains 
controversial in the area of what we might call ‘full insolvency’ in which the 
interests of many different stakeholders are implicated, as we have already 
described, in the types of debt restructuring with which this paper is 
concerned sophisticated financing documents will be negotiated which will 
set out in detail how control rights are allocated and exercised in default.
98
  
Modern financing documents may go a long way towards providing the 
necessary stay on creditor action, through a combination of majority voting 
provisions and limited moratoria on junior creditor enforcement action for 
some period after negotiations start.
99
 Thus, although there may not be an 
identity of interest amongst the creditor group and the truce may be a very 
uneasy one, in most cases there is either a contractual stay or a practical stay 
on action absent a legal one.
100
 
 
C  The ABI Commission Report 
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The ABI Commission report and recommendations recognise that the rise of 
the distressed debt market, and the rise of secured credit, have both 
undermined the mechanisms in Chapter 11 which are designed to steer the 
parties away from a sale and towards restructuring.
101
 Crucially, though, the 
report does not appear to conclude that the distressed debt market operates 
in large and larger mid-cap cases to identify and capture the restructuring 
surplus, and reaffirms a commitment to the traditional policy objectives of 
Chapter 11 in imposing a stay and steering creditor choice. 
First, the Commission recommends a 60-day moratorium on section 
363 sales, reinforcing the role of the automatic stay in creating a breathing 
space for the debtor.
102
  Perhaps more significantly, the ABI has seen the 
potential to develop a new mechanism to control creditor choice between 
restructuring on the one hand and insolvency on the other.  The Commission 
recommendations suggest that where the business and assets are sold to a 
third party, a more complex valuation exercise will take place and, if that 
exercise suggests that there might have been value for other financial 
creditors if the company had continued to trade and been sold at a later date, 
senior creditors may be required to give up some of the consideration for the 
sale to junior creditors, even though any surplus which does in fact emerge 
will be captured by the purchaser.
103
  This would seem to be a powerful new 
mechanism to steer creditors towards restructuring and away from a sale to a 
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third party for cash, even where the market concludes that that is the right 
outcome.  If we remain sceptical that the distressed debt market is operating 
so that companies which are susceptible to a debt restructuring are being 
sold to third parties instead, then more empirical work may be needed to 
support this policy response.
104
 
It is also notable that the ABI Commission proposes that section 363 
‘sales’ to financial creditors should follow additional requirements, broadly 
drawn from Chapter 11.
105
  This would seem to be aimed at preventing 
financial creditors from using section 363 to achieve what is functionally a 
debt restructuring without complying with the requirements for 
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganisation.   Ultimately, it leads to 
the question of whether those requirements require some revision in light of 
new market mechanisms, and this is considered further below. 
 
 
4 Rethinking the Theory of Corporate Bankruptcy Law 
 
Having dedicated a considerable portion of this article to considering what 
modern corporate bankruptcy law does not do in large and larger mid-cap 
cases, we must now try to set out a new theoretical framework against 
which it can be assessed.   
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Notwithstanding the diverse range of creditors which a company 
may have, this article has argued that none of them is incentivised to 
implement a sale and enforcement where the distressed debt market has 
identified a restructuring surplus in a large or larger mid-cap case.  It is 
suggested that the English market provides powerful evidence for this 
because, notwithstanding the fact that no moratorium is available in 
schemes of arrangement, there is no clarion call for a moratorium to be 
introduced.
106
  The English approach of a smorgasbord of procedures which 
financial creditors can choose between appears to have operated well in the 
financial crisis, and the US approach of a single gateway which all 
financially distressed companies must squeeze through does not appear to 
be necessary in order to enable viable businesses to continue to trade.  Thus 
the first thing we might do is impose an analytic divide between the role of 
corporate bankruptcy law when the market does not see a restructuring 
surplus (which we shall call an insolvency), and the role of corporate 
bankruptcy law when it does (which we shall call a restructuring). We might 
then consider whether different roles have developed for corporate 
bankruptcy law in large and larger mid-cap cases in the two situations. 
 Where a financially distressed company approaches its lenders in 
order to seek a new bargain, but the existing lenders are not willing to 
continue to support it and the distressed debt market does not consider that 
there is a restructuring surplus to be captured, corporate bankruptcy law’s 
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role looks much the same as before.  It is in everyone's interests that the 
money which is tied up in this failed business is extracted and redeployed 
elsewhere.  Corporate bankruptcy law provides a stay, or moratorium, so 
that the business can be kept together and sold as a going concern wherever 
possible, in order to maximise the amount of capital which is redeployed.  It 
also provides the priority rules according to which the proceeds are 
distributed and remains concerned that this redeployment of capital does not 
result in externalities, such as the cost of lost jobs, which ought properly to 
be taken into account in assessing whether the overall amount of capital 
which is redeployed is maximised.  Similarly, corporate bankruptcy law is 
concerned not just with the external allocation of capital (ensuring that 
capital is allocated to companies best able to use it) but also internal 
allocation of capital (the investment of capital within a company).  Thus it 
imposes duties on directors to ensure that capital is not invested in risky 
projects designed only to further shareholder interests, and it adjusts 
payments made in the vicinity of insolvency to reduce incentives to favour 
some stakeholders over others.
107
  This rather ambitiously pithy summary of 
the role of corporate bankruptcy law in an insolvency situation would be as 
familiar to an insolvency scholar in 1986 as it is today.  We would include 
any sale of the business and assets, or assets, and the transfer of only some 
of the liabilities to a third party on this side of the analytic divide.  This 
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could include a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 liquidating plan or a section 363 
sale to a third party (in the US) or a sale to a third party in a  creditors’ 
voluntary or compulsory winding up, administration or pre-packaged 
administration (in the UK). 
 Corporate bankruptcy law has a different role, however where the 
market concludes that the company is worth more if it continues to trade. 
Ordinarily, a period of debt trading will have ensued, in which some 
financial creditors have left and new creditors have arrived, and it remains 
for a new bargain to be struck so that the company can emerge with an 
appropriate capital structure.  However, negotiations over the new bargain 
are highly likely to arrive at a classically deadlocked position.  Deadlock 
arises in restructuring negotiations where no party is prepared to 
compromise, but no party has the ability to compel the other to agree.
108
  In 
an earlier piece the author described the ‘hyper rationality’ of distressed 
debt investors,
109
 in other words their desire to capture every last crumb of 
their slice of the pie.  At the same time, financial creditors and equity in the 
junior layers of the capital structure have little incentive to agree to a plan in 
which they receive no, or only a nominal, allocation.
110
  Moreover, the fluid 
                                                     
108 See Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations: Causes and Solutions A Narlkier (ed) (Cambridge 
University Press 2010), 1-20 
109 Paterson (n 26), 337-342.  See also Harner, ‘The Corporate Governance and Public Policy 
Implications of Activist Distressed Debt Investing’ (n 26) 754 and fn 331 
110 See, for example, CJ Fortgnag and TM Mayer, ‘Valuation in Bankruptcy’ (1985) 32(6) UCLA 
Law Review 1061, 1106; GG Triantis, ‘A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession 
Financing’ (1993) 46 Vanderbilt Law Review 901, 906; LoPucki and Whitford, ‘The Nature of the 
Bankrupt Firm’ (n 27), 662; K O’Rourke, ‘Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations 
(Activism, Uncertainty and Abuse: Current Issues in Bankruptcy Law)’ (2005) 25 Columbia Business 
Law Review 403; M Crystal and RJ Mokal, ‘The Valuation of Companies: A Conceptual  
Framework: Part I’ (2006) International Corporate Rescue 63, 66  
nature of the creditor group, and the lack of a long-standing relationship 
between debtor and creditor, both contribute to making resolution more 
problematic.
111
  Finally, as explained above, whilst other types of financial 
creditor are not incentivised proactively to enforce and sell, they may 
continue to prefer enforcement and sale to a restructuring plan.
112
  Overall, 
compromise is difficult to achieve and negotiations can easily become 
protracted.  
The state has an interest in unlocking this deadlock position because 
it wishes the maximum amount of capital to be redeployed in the economy 
as rapidly as possible.  Thus it stands ready to provide the tools to force 
dissenting creditors, or hold outs, to accept a transaction so that the 
restructuring can be implemented.  In this view, modern restructuring law 
provides a deadlock resolution procedure.  In the US we would include a 
debt restructuring implemented via a ‘sale’ of the entire business to the 
financial creditors pursuant to section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code or a 
Chapter 11 reorganization plan on this side of the analytic divide and in the 
UK we would include a debt restructuring pursuant to a scheme of 
arrangement, a scheme of arrangement ‘twinned’ with a pre-packaged 
administration sale or a standalone pre-packaged administration sale to 
some of the financial creditors. 
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Difficult issues arise for restructuring law in breaking the deadlock.  
First, restructuring law must decide who it can bind to a restructuring plan.  
The 'cram down' provisions of Chapter 11 enable a plan to be imposed 
against the wishes of the shareholders,
113
 whilst (as we have seen) this can 
only be achieved in English law by the rather cumbersome 'twinning' of a 
scheme of arrangement with a pre-packaged administration sale.
114
  
Undoubtedly matters would be more straightforward, and more transparent, 
if this could be tackled in a single procedure in English law, and English 
lawyers continue to mull over whether reform of the law in this direction 
would be broadly beneficial.
115
   
 Secondly, and more controversially, corporate bankruptcy law must 
decide the basis on which it will impose a restructuring plan on dissenters. 
Where the restructuring takes the form of a debt-for-equity swap amongst 
financial creditors (and potentially shareholders) this is a difficult question 
because the creditors and shareholders who receive equity in the debt-for-
equity swap are changing the nature of their investment, but they are not 
crystallising a real economic loss.  They will have the residual interest in the 
company and only once the company is floated or sold will it be clear how 
much of the debt they have recovered (and how much profit they have 
made).  If there is a day of reckoning at all, it is a day of interim and not 
final judgement.  This is the real question for policy makers in England and 
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the US: whether modern restructuring law and practice enables senior 
financial creditors to capture value which junior financial creditors and 
shareholders argue should have accrued to them – and, crucially, if it does 
whether we should be concerned about it.   
In assessing the proposed new bargain the traditional approach in 
Europe has been to ask only whether those creditors who do not receive 
equity would have been better off if the insolvency route had been followed 
instead, and the business and assets sold.
116
 This is usually established by a 
short bidding process which fixes the 'counterfactual' market price (the 
'auction approach').
117
  In other words, the European approach considers 
whether the bargain leaves some creditors worse off than the alternative, but 
it does not tackle whether some creditors receive too good a bargain at the 
cost of others.  
Chapter 11 takes a different approach (the 'bargaining and litigation 
approach').  Concerned that the auction approach may produce an artificially 
low value when the market is distressed, and there is an absence of bidders 
and finance, it has left the parties to negotiate value using traditional 
valuation techniques such as discounted cash flow, comparable pricing and 
(recently) a private equity valuation, with the judge stepping in to make a 
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decision if the parties cannot.
118
  This gives rise to a different concern: that 
transaction costs are increased in negotiating with parties who have very 
little interest in the case, but nothing to lose by delay and debate.
119
    
This has led some scholars to suggest a move away from attempting 
to crystallise value at all given, as we have seen, that economically the new 
equity holders are reshaping their bargain, but are not crystallising a loss.  
The alternative 'options model' builds on the seminal work of Black and 
Scholes.
120
  It is still necessary to value the business at the time of the 
restructuring, and only those creditors with debt covered by the valuation 
receive equity.  But all other stakeholders receive an option with a strike 
price equal to the full amount of the claims ranking senior to them.
121
 Even 
if the creditors face liquidity constraints in exercising their options, they 
have a corporate security (the option) which has a value and which they are 
able to sell in the market.
122
 The problem with the 'options approach', 
though, is that the firm should emerge with a capital structure which 
properly reflects its future prospects, and problems may arise if the capital 
structure with which the firm emerges is too complex.
123
  Moreover, time 
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and cost may still be wasted negotiating the terms of the options which, in 
the event, have very little value indeed. 
The ABI Commission takes a different tack again.  Very broadly, it 
adopts the idea of resetting the capital structure with equity holders and 
option holders but, instead of issuing the options, it uses options pricing 
methodology to calculate whether the options would have a value if they 
were issued and were then sold in the market.  If the answer is that they 
would have a value, then the junior stakeholder receives an allocation of 
value in the restructuring in debt, cash, equity etc.  If the answer is that they 
would have no value then the junior creditor receives nothing at all.
124
  It 
remains to be seen what the market reaction will be to this somewhat 
complex model.  It certainly seems to retain the contours of bargaining and 
litigation in agreeing the appropriate options methodology, the enterprise 
value of the company for the purposes of establishing the strike price and 
the volatility rate for the option.   
The author has suggested elsewhere that restructuring law must 
adopt a middle ground between the ‘best price reasonably obtainable’ 
approach of insolvency law and the value destructive risks inherent in a 
subjective valuation approach.
125
 Current proposals to deal with this issue in 
the US include using neutral experts to arbitrate on questions of value,
126
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and the author has made her own suggestions for UK law.
127
 But there is 
also a pressing need for empirical work to decide whether we care about 
allocative fairness in the restructuring of financial liabilities in large and 
larger mid-cap companies, where we are not concerned with debts due to 
weak or vulnerable creditors, such as employees or small trade suppliers or 
customers, but with the claims of large, sophisticated financial institutions 
who make calculated investment decisions, who have the wherewithal to 
adjust the price at which they transact and who are free to decide whether to 
transact at all.   
  It is suggested here that whether the scholar, practitioner or policy 
maker relates to the progressive school or the law and economics 
movement, he or she only cares about the allocation of losses amongst these 
large, sophisticated financial creditors if it has an impact on (i) the total cost 
of credit (ii) the depth and strength of the finance market (meaning whether 
any constraints on the availability of finance will emerge) and (iii) the 
availability of equity financing, for healthy companies.  These are 
complicated questions because the capital structures which the law supports 
must also match the risk and reward appetite of the providers of finance 
within a jurisdiction.  Within the highly bank-dominated finance market of 
the UK in the last 50 years it may not have mattered whether or not senior 
creditor friendly insolvency and restructuring law held back the emergence 
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of a strong junior credit market.
128
  As we move away from relying solely 
on banks as the source of capital for corporate Britain it may still not matter 
if sufficient, all-senior capital structures (at a blended interest rate which is 
higher than that for senior debt in a senior/junior capital structure but lower 
than that for purely junior subordinated debt) is available.
129
  But if 
insolvency and restructuring law does influence capital structure, and the 
structures which it supports are not attractive for all the financiers whom we 
may wish to attract to the jurisdiction, it may matter very much indeed.  US 
scholars have argued that this is precisely why Chapter 11 seeks to leave the 
development of capital structures to the market.
130
  But this is not quite right 
either.  As the new Commission proposals reignite debate on the role of the 
law in steering creditor choice between restructuring and insolvency they 
may very well have an influence on the availability of senior credit and its 
cost.  Without detailed empirical work we can never be confident that any 
insolvency or restructuring law is a benign influence in the market. 
This analysis is only applicable to large and larger mid-cap 
companies where a restructuring is likely to take the form of an exchange of 
financial liabilities for equity.  The position is murkier for small and 
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medium sized companies, where it is possible that something of a hybrid 
between restructuring and insolvency may occur.  It is unlikely that a debt-
for-equity swap will be an attractive solution where there is no liquid market 
for the shares and it is also unlikely that there will be sufficient financial 
liabilities to absorb all the losses.   Instead, the business and assets may be 
sold to a new company owned by incumbent management, supported by the 
incumbent financial creditors who roll over all or some of their debt on new 
terms to the new company (functionally a debt restructuring), but only some 
of the trade liabilities may be transferred to the new business and others left 
behind in the now insolvent corporate shell (as would occur in an 
insolvency sale).  This is a messy (and controversial) scenario but amply 
illustrates why a different theoretical framework is needed for small and 
medium sized companies.
131
  It is also accepted that special considerations 
may apply in mass tort cases.
132
 
Two further notes of caution are added.  First, the article has made 
the case for the efficiency of the distressed debt market in selecting between 
good companies with bad balance sheets, and bad companies, but has held 
its hand up to a lack of detailed empirical support and has pointed to a line 
of thought in the US literature in the other direction.  Clearly more work is 
needed.  At least three obvious areas of enquiry present themselves.  The 
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first is considering whether there are particular sectors or types of business 
where a different dynamic is at play (such as real estate businesses).  The 
second is whether there are structural differences between the UK and the 
US finance markets which go to the analysis.  For example, in the UK the 
first purchase of distressed debt is still likely to be from a bank.  It is 
possible that banks, constrained by capital requirements and the impact of 
recognising a significant loss on their balance sheet, drive a harder bargain 
than those trading debt in the US.
133
  If this is right, it might be the case that 
there is a greater profit to be captured on an enforcement sale and 
distribution of proceeds in the US than in the UK.  Or it may be that more of 
the section 363 ‘sales’ to financial creditors described in the US literature 
implicate trade creditors, even in large and larger mid-cap cases, than is the 
case in a scheme of arrangement ‘twinned’ with a pre-packaged 
administration in the UK.  Finally concerns raised most prominently by 
Harvey Miller will benefit from examination, as cases which were 
restructured during the Financial Crisis trade out from it.  Mr Miller has 
argued strenuously that the relatively short term horizon of the distressed 
debt investors, focused on a rapid exit from the investment within a 
comparatively short number of years of the restructuring, and the focus on 
the balance sheet which has been described here, may both have the result 
that necessary operational restructuring is not undertaken, such that the 
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company does not emerge in good health and only fails again relatively 
quickly.
134
   
Finally, a note of caution is sounded for the future.  This article is 
written at a time of extraordinary liquidity, fuelled in no small part by 
government policy in the financial crisis.  If this liquidity were to dry up, so 
that the distressed debt market could not fulfil the role prescribed for it here, 
then the law and practice of restructuring and insolvency may yet move 
back to something far more reminiscent of the early 1990s.  Moreover, the 
capital markets are in constant, and rapid, change.  Loan agreements 
typically contain a number of ratios designed to monitor the financial health 
of the company.
135
  As bond issues with very few covenants, and so called 
‘covenant lite’ loans, replace loan arrangements with a detailed suite of 
covenants used to monitor the financial health of the business, it may be that 
lenders have far less power to bring management to the table early.
136
  This 
may mean that restructuring negotiations are launched in the face of an 
impending liquidity crisis, so that there is simply no time for those who do 
not see their future with the company to trade out and those who do to trade 
in.  As ever, writing in a fast moving and unpredictable area, a crystal ball 
would be a friend. 
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 5 Conclusion 
Traditionally US bankruptcy scholars have agreed that it is a central 
objective of all bankruptcy law to impose a stay on individual creditor 
action, so that the business and assets can be kept together and restructured 
if possible, or sold as a going concern if not.  Some scholars have also 
worried that those near the top of corporate bankruptcy law's order of 
distributional priority will prefer a rapid sale and distribution of proceeds 
over a protracted restructuring renegotiation.  US federal bankruptcy law 
provides a strong moratorium and strong management rights to address 
these concerns.   
 Powerful bank lenders in the English market have traditionally 
pointed to the danger that a strong moratorium and strong management 
rights will both reduce the availability, and increase the cost, of credit for 
healthy companies and will allow companies which ought to fail to continue 
to trade.  These concerns reflect the concerns of law and economics scholars 
in the US (and the debate between the progressive school and the law and 
economics movement in that jurisdiction) and have been influential in the 
development of English corporate bankruptcy law.   
Significant changes in the market in both jurisdictions have appeared 
to be bringing law in action closer together – indeed, US and UK 
restructuring practice has appeared to be meeting in the middle.  But the 
ABI Commission has made recommendations which appear to reaffirm a 
commitment to a philosophically different approach, and the two 
jurisdictions may yet grow apart again. 
 This article has suggested that the new market dynamics largely take 
care of the old policy concerns in large cases.  It has argued for a strong, 
analytic divide between the role of corporate bankruptcy law in the 
insolvency of large and larger mid-cap companies (when the financial 
creditors are no longer willing to support it and new creditors cannot be 
found) and its role where the financial creditors are willing to support the 
business, but their debt arrangements must be restructured.  It has suggested 
that a new set of concerns arise, which are broadly the same whatever view 
one takes of the need to protect jobs and more vulnerable trade creditors on 
the one hand, and the need to protect the state of the finance markets for 
healthy companies on the other.  However, it is recognised that this analytic 
divide is limited to large and larger mid-cap over-leveraged companies, and 
the article has suggested the need to think about small and medium sized 
companies separately.  It has also noted the need for further empirical 
research, and has sounded a note of caution for future adaptations in the 
finance market. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
